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I. Introduction 
In this paper, I will be addressing the questions: what is the capabilities approach? How 
does this framework help us to understand how altering our – and our children’s – bodies can 
assist in achieving equality for minorities? Or does it instead work against accomplishing this 
goal? How does this framework help us to understand how altering the bodies of people with 
disabilities can also protects those individuals’ dignity? Or does it do the opposite? 
First, I will lay out the structure of Martha Nussbaum’s view of the capabilities approach, 
which is a normative framework used in assessing justice and equality, as well as quality of life 
and well-being. A normative framework is one that “[establishes]… a standard or norm, 
especially of behavior,”1 and can be distinguished from a prescriptive framework, which is one 
that “[relates] to the imposition or enforcement of a rule or method.”2 Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach operates under the normative claim that quality of life can be best achieved through 
access to a certain set of capabilities, which can be understood as ways of being. If everyone has 
access to the ten basic capabilities she lays out, Nussbaum argues that equality will result. 
Because her approach is normative and not prescriptive, Nussbaum is not aiming to enforce this 
set of capabilities in society, but instead to enable discourse about equality and quality-of-life 
judgements in an effort to implement a new status quo that supports everyone. To cite 
Nussbaum, “[the Capabilities Approach] ascribes an urgent task to government and public policy 
– namely, to improve the quality of life for all people, as defined by their capabilities.”3 
Next, I will examine the argument of philosophers Wilfond et al. in relation to their work 
 
1 “Normative: Definition of Normative,” Lexico Dictionaries, 2020. 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/normative.  
2 “Prescriptive: Definition of Prescriptive,” Lexico Dictionaries, 2020. 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/prescriptive.  
3 Martha C. Nussbaum, “The Central Capabilities,” in Creating Capabilities: the Human Development Approach. 
(Cambridge: Harvard, 2011), 19. 
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on growth attenuation and the bioethical implications associated with this medical intervention. 
The specific case of growth attenuation that is presented in Wilfond’s argument is what has been 
commonly referred to as ‘The Ashley Treatment:’ the medical intervention that consisted of a 
“hysterectomy [(or the surgical removal of the uterus)], the removal of ‘breast buds’ to prohibit 
growth of breasts[,] and treatment with high doses of oestrogen [in order to reduce final height]”4 
on a six-year-old, profoundly developmentally disabled child named Ashley. The goal of this 
treatment was to stunt her overall height in order for her parents to take care of her more easily. 
Specifically, I will evaluate what pro tanto principles are at odds in Wilfond et al.’s argument, 
and reason through which principles should take precedence. 
Pro tanto principles are necessary in everyday life to help us make our way 
throughout our days without being incapacitated by fear, helplessness, or frustration 
when it comes to making decisions. Pro tanto principles are “principles that tell us that 
we have strong reasons to do something, even though there might be circumstances 
where those reasons are outweighed or overridden by competing moral considerations,”5 
and can help us make decisions as simple and easy as what to eat for breakfast in the 
morning. In fact, we reason through pro tanto principles and decide which ones take 
precedence in given situations quite often. 
For example, one may hold the pro tanto principle that eating a healthy, balanced 
diet is important for overall good health, and also the pro tanto obligation that one shall 
not steal. Let me propose an example that will test these two pro tanto principles to see 
which is more important. Kelly walks into her kitchen in the morning and opens her 
fridge, ready to make some whole wheat toast with peanut butter for breakfast, which is 
both healthy and balanced and will fuel her with energy for the long day ahead. However, 
upon opening the fridge, which she shares with her two roommates, Kelly notices that she 
is out of bread for her toast; she finished her last slice at breakfast yesterday and forgot to 
pick up more at the grocery store after work. There is bread in the fridge, however; but it 
is one of her roommate’s loaves and there is only one slice left. Here, Kelly sees two pro 
tanto principles in conflict with one another. The question in this case -- and in most 
cases which take pro tanto principles into consideration – is: which principle takes 
precedence? Whichever does take precedence will impact Kelly’s decision, as she will 
reason through which pro tanto principle she values more and will make the choice 
favoring which principle she chooses. Perhaps Kelly believes that her healthy diet is more 
important, and that she should take the slice of her roommate’s bread so that she isn’t 
hungry at work. Or maybe instead she thinks that stealing her roommate’s last piece of 
 
4 S D Edwards, “The Ashley treatment: a step too far, or not far enough?” Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (2008): 341–
43. 
5 Rajczi, “Conflicts Between Pro Tanto Principles,” 1. 
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bread is cruel and selfish, so she would rather go to work hungry and without breakfast. 
Regardless of her decision, Kelly must reason through which principle she favors over 
the other in this case, carefully weighing the pros and cons of each (even if it seems to be 
a very quick decision in her eyes, and she does not even realize that she is in fact 
participating in such a philosophical process). 
“Oftentimes the principle which takes precedence (or should take precedence) 
contributes to values that uphold morality.”6 
 
 I will then evaluate the arguments of Steven D. Edwards, who proposes five main 
objections to the Ashley treatment, which specifically propose why it could be deemed morally 
impermissible. While Edwards ultimately argues that four of the five objections are not 
compelling, his discussion surrounding the moral permissibility of the Ashley treatment is 
necessary to consider the argument for supporting the treatment. After positing the fifth and final 
objection, Edwards ultimately argues that “the most serious concern raised by the case is that it 
may set a worrying precedent if the moral principle employed in justification of the treatment is 
applied again to endorse it in similar circumstances.”7 
 An important distinction I must make is that in this whole paper, I will not be concerned 
with whether or not the Ashley treatment should be legal, or in any way associated with the law 
or policy. Instead, I will be presenting multiple arguments, then taking a stance on which 
argument I believe is more morally permissible. I will posit my opinion on this in the final 
section of the paper. 
  
 
6 Allison Hill, “Weighing Pro Tanto Principles: Should Physicians Intervene in Patients’ Medical Decisions?” 
(Phil186 Essay, Claremont McKenna College, 2019). 
7 Edwards, “The Ashley treatment,” 341. 
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II. Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach 
Renowned philosopher Martha Nussbaum is one of the original developers of the 
capabilities approach; however, Amartya Sen was the first philosopher to introduce the theory, 
and many other philosophers, political scientists, and ethicists have built their own conceptions 
of it. In this paper, I will adopt Nussbaum’s interpretation, because I believe it is the clearest in 
establishing what is needed to achieve universal justice and better qualities of life. According to 
Nussbaum, “the Capabilities Approach can be provisionally defined as an approach to 
comparative quality-of-life assessment and to theorizing about basic social justice. It holds that 
the key question to ask, when comparing societies and assessing them for their basic decency or 
justice, is, ‘What is each person able to do and to be?’” Another reason I will be utilizing 
Nussbaum’s notion of the capabilities approach is that “[Amartya] Sen does not employ a 
threshold or a specific list of capabilities… nor does he make central theoretical use of the 
concept of human dignity.”8 
Nussbaum “[uses] the plural, ‘Capabilities,’ in order to emphasize that the most important 
elements of people’s quality of life are plural and qualitatively distinct.”9 Nussbaum’s approach 
argues that having more capabilities – or access to more capabilities – will increase one’s 
functionings. She defines a functioning as “an active realization of one or more capabilities.”10 
Functionings can best be categorized by things you can do: being warm, playing with others, and 
working. A capability, on the other hand, “answers… the question, ‘What is this person able to 
do and to be?’”11 Capabilities, therefore, are abilities to do or to be in certain states of 
functioning. There is a difference between having the capability of doing something and then 
 
8 Nussbaum, “Capabilities,” 19-20. 
9 Nussbaum, “Capabilities,” 18. 
10 Nussbaum, “Capabilities,” 25. 
11 Nussbaum, “Capabilities,” 20. 
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actually pursuing that, through a functioning. According to Nussbaum, from a justice point of 
view, we should not care about how people are functioning (or choosing to function), but about 
their access to the capabilities associated with functioning. She places a strong emphasis on the 
choice of individuals; from a public policy or political point of view, governments and societies 
should not be concerned with how individuals choose to exercise their capabilities, as much as 
we should be concerned with whether or not individuals have access to securing basic 
capabilities. 
Therefore, Nussbaum posits, injustice occurs when people do not have the capability to 
achieve certain valuable functionings that are necessary to achieve a fulfilling human life. For 
example, there are survival capabilities, like the capability to be sufficiently nourished and 
maintain a healthy temperature (by being warm enough), and then there are functionings which 
make life “plural and qualitatively distinct.”12 You do not need these additional functionings to 
stay alive, but rather to both flourish as a human being and to uphold personal, everyday dignity. 
Nussbaum’s definitive list of central capabilities serves as an addition to the bare 
minimum survival functionings that everyone should be able to achieve, regardless of disability 
or cognitive functioning. The ten capabilities she lists answer the question: “What does a life 
worthy of human dignity require?”13 They are: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, 
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control 
over one’s environment (both political and material).14 If someone is able to attain all of these 
capabilities, Nussbaum argues that they will have a better quality of life than someone who does 
not have access to them. Nussbaum also argues that until everyone has access to these 
 
12 Nussbaum, “Capabilities.” 18. 
13 Nussbaum, “Capabilities.” 32. 
14 Nussbaum, “Capabilities.” 33-34. 
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capabilities, we are living in an unjust society; however, once everyone is able to achieve access 
to the ten basic capabilities, we have reached equality (or at least enough equality). 
In her book Disability with Dignity: Justice, Human Rights and Equal Status, Linda 
Barclay examines how best to preserve the dignity of people with disabilities (both as individuals 
and as a community). Barclay defines what she calls the “’everyday concept’ of disability” by 
referring to fellow philosophers Guy Keohane and Julian Savalescu, who argue that such a 
definition should “[incorporate] both a descriptive and an evaluative component”15 in order to be 
as inclusive and accurate as possible. Keohane and Savalescu expand: 
“Descriptively, the disabled are people with certain physical or cognitive features that 
lead to a loss of some function or ability that most people possess. Evaluatively, such people are 
said to suffer from disability; that to lack some function or ability that most people possess is a 
misfortune.”16 Whenever I use the word disability throughout the rest of this paper, I will be 
utilizing Keohane and Savalescu’s inclusive definition of the word. 
In the book’s chapter titled “A Just Distribution of Capabilities,” Barclay uses 
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach to “[assess] whether the capabilities approach is a suitable 
theory of justice for disability.”17  Ultimately she argues that approaches like Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach do, in fact, “propose the right kind of solutions to disadvantage.”18 This is 
why applying the capabilities approach to assessing justice of people with disabilities (compared 
to people without disabilities) is so important. Later, I will discuss how the Ashley treatment is a 
prime example of how Nussbaum’s capabilities approach can support people with disabilities to 
 
     15  Barclay, Linda. Disability with Dignity: Justice, Human Rights and Equal Status. (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2019), 13. 
16 Barclay, Disability with Dignity, 13-14. 
17 Barclay, Disability with Dignity, 63. 
18 Barclay, Disability with Dignity, 63. 
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uphold dignity and improve quality of life for people with disabilities. 
  
 
 11 
III. The Ashley Treatment 
To provide background information and context for the two arguments I will present – by 
Wilfond et al. and Edwards – I will explain who Ashley is, what ‘the Ashley treatment’ is, and 
why it was administered. 
Ashley was a “severely intellectually and physically disabled child”19 whose disabilities 
were a result of her diagnosis of static encephalopathy. Static encephalopathy can be 
distinguished from progressive encephalopathy, in that with the static (and non-progressive) 
diagnosis, “although patients may have delayed motor milestones, they do not lose milestones, as 
they do in a progressive neurologic disorder.”20 However, because of her profound 
developmental and physical disabilities, Ashley lacked the ability to participate in normal daily 
activities, since “her disabilities are such that she is unable to walk or talk, or even move herself 
to change position when lying down.”21 Ashley’s parents also cite that “her cognitive ability is 
similar to that of a 3-month old infant.”22 However, while Ashley’s disabilities are incredibly 
profound, her parents said that she “[enjoys] the lights and sounds of TV, music[,] and the 
company and embraces of her family.”23 Because of her impairments, Ashley required constant 
care by her parents which included, but was not limited to, “feeding, dressing, toileting, and 
mobility assistance.”24 
Ashley’s parents began to realize when she was six years old that she began to put on 
weight rather rapidly and was “showing signs of premature onset of puberty, hence her 
 
19 Edwards, “The Ashley treatment,” 341. 
20 “Static Encephalopathy.” Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine. Case Western Reserve 
University, July 17, 2006. http://casemed.case.edu/clerkships/neurology/NeurLrngObjectives/CP.htm. 
21 Edwards, “The Ashley treatment,” 341. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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secondary sexual characteristics were developing at an early age.”25 As her primary caregivers, 
Ashley’s parents were responsible for moving Ashley, dressing her, feeding her, changing her 
diapers, and working to ensure the best quality of life for her on a daily basis. As a result of her 
rapid growth, Ashley’s parents began to grow concerned over how they would be able to care for 
her in the same way if she was much heavier, which would make their everyday duties much 
more difficult. However, they also believed that if Ashley was smaller and lighter (and did not 
continue to grow or develop through puberty), her “parents believed… [that participating] in 
more social and recreational activities”26 would also be less of a difficulty; since Ashley was 
believed to have enjoyed such things, her parents wanted to ensure that their child’s well-being 
was maximized. 
As a result of their growing concerns, Ashley’s parents sought out the opinions of 
medical professionals at Seattle Children’s Hospital27 in order to discuss potential medical 
interventions to administer to Ashley. According to Ashley’s parents, the sole motivation behind 
this was to ensure that Ashley has the best quality of life possible. Because Ashley does not have 
the capacity to understand the medical interventions, or make medical decisions herself, Ashley’s 
parents serve as the proxy decision makers for her. As her parents, they are the people who best 
support Ashley’s autonomy in making medical decisions, since she is unable to do so. 
This is a core principle of bioethics, and it is called autonomy. Philosophers Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress state that “personal autonomy encompasses, at a minimum, 
self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and from certain limitations 
 
25 Steven D. Edwards, “The Case of Ashley X.” Clinical Ethics 6 (2011): pp. 39. 
https://doi.org/10.1258/ce.2011.011007.  
26 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,” 27. 
27 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,” 28. 
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such as an inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice.”28 In the medical field, or 
from a healthcare perspective, autonomy is practiced when making decisions about one’s own 
medical care. Patients must always give doctors consent before proceeding with any kind of 
medical intervention (this includes everything from vaccines, to administering medicine, to more 
serious procedures like surgeries). And in order to give informed consent, there is a set of boxes 
that a patient must check off, like being competent to make a decision. According to Beauchamp 
and Childress, patients “are competent to make a decision if they have the capacity to understand 
the material information, to make a judgment about this information in light of their values, to 
intend a certain outcome, and to communicate freely their wishes to caregivers or 
investigators.”29 To give some quick background, here is a brief summary of informed consent 
from the National Institutes of Health: 
Informed consent is a process in which a health care provider educates a patient about the 
risks, benefits, and alternatives of a given procedure or intervention. The patient must be 
competent to make a voluntary decision about whether to undergo the said 
procedure. Informed consent is both an ethical and legal obligation of medical 
practitioners in the US and originates from the patient's right to direct what happens to 
his/her body. Implicit in providing informed consent is an assessment of the patient's 
understanding, rendering an actual recommendation, and documentation of the process. 
The Joint Commission requires documentation of all the elements of informed consent 
“in a form, progress notes or elsewhere in the record.” The following are the 
required elements for documentation of the informed consent discussion: (1) the nature of 
the procedure, (2) the risks and benefits and the procedure, (3) reasonable alternatives, (4) 
risks and benefits of alternatives, and (5) assessment of the patient's understanding of 
elements 1 through 4.30 
 
Unfortunately, because of some individuals states of being, informed consent is not 
possible because competency is not possible. Therefore, personal autonomy cannot be carried 
 
28 Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F Childress. “Respect for Autonomy.” Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 2009, 99–
114. https://claremont.illiad.oclc.org/illiad/pdf/556866.pdf.  
29 Shah, Parth, Imani Thornton, and John E. Hipskind. “Informed Consent.” National Center for Biotechnology 
Information. U.S. National Library of Medicine, March 30, 2020. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK430827/.  
30 Ibid. 
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through as it would in a perfect-world setting, and Ashley is a prime example of this. However, 
there are still ways to respect and uphold Ashley’s autonomy even though she is unable to make 
her own medical decisions. Beauchamp and Childress state that “mental incapacitation limits the 
autonomy of a severely retarded person,”31 but that proxy decision makers who can make 
medical decisions in the best interest of individuals can also respect individuals’ autonomy (even 
if they are not themselves making a decision about their own bodies). And, in fact, this is more 
common than you may think: children under the age of eighteen are not, under law, deemed 
competent enough to give valid consent or make their own medical decisions. Therefore, more 
often than not, it is the patient’s parents who act as their proxy decision makers to make an 
informed decision and give consent to act in their best interest. Of course, if there is a case where 
doctors sense that the proxy decision makers are not acting in the best interest of the patient, 
doctors have the ability to judge the situation and ask the court to rule the decision. 
Ultimately, in an effort to uphold Ashley’s personal autonomy and to maximize her quality 
of life and well-being, her parents made the medical decision to administer the medical 
intervention that has since been dubbed ‘the Ashley treatment.’ This consisted of “a 
hysterectomy, the removal of ‘breast buds’ to prohibit growth of breasts [,] and treatment with 
high doses of oestrogen”32 “to reduce her final height”33 from “a predicted five feet four inches 
to approximately four feet six inches.”34 
Ashley’s parents’ claim that their decision was strongly aligned with their vision for a 
better quality of life for their daughter: a life where she could be present in family activities, and 
 
31 Beauchamp and Childress, “Respect for Autonomy,” 54. 
32 Edwards, “The Ashley treatment,” 341. 
33 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,” 27. 
34 Ibid. 
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to also “participate in more social and recreational activities”35 outside of the home, like sledding 
in the snow or going down a slide at the playground. In addition, Ashley’s growth attenuation 
would assist her parent’s in “routine activities like dressing [her] and changing [her] diapers.”36 
While the entire treatment (cited earlier) is referred to as the “Ashley Treatment,”37 Wilfond et 
al. focus their argument on assessing the ethicality of only the first step of the treatment, which 
was administering the estrogen patches. 
Ashley’s case gained widespread media attention after its inception and publicity 
following a published blog post by Ashley’s parents. The public weighed in with various 
opinions about the moral permissibility of the treatment, and the argument amongst medical 
professionals, ethics boards, and philosophers continues to this day. Wilfond et al.’s article 
presents the majority opinion of “a twenty-person working group [who] convened to discuss the 
ethical and policy considerations of… ‘growth attenuation,’ and if possible to develop practical 
guidance for health professionals.”38 The group was diverse, and consisted of medical 
professionals; members of the disabled community; and impartial spectators with individual, 
varying opinions of their own.  
 
35 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,”27. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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IV. Wilfond et al. and Growth Attenuation 
“Navigating Growth Attenuation in Children with Profound Disabilities” by Benjamin 
Wilfond and Paul Miller is a bioethics article which analyzes the Ashley treatment and its moral 
permissibility. To provide context, I will begin this section by explaining what Wilfond et al.’s 
argument is, then examine which pro tanto principles are in conflict with one another, and which 
should take precedence after reasoning through them. 
The authors then assert that some people believe – and as parents, raise their kids to 
believe – that we should “accept our… bodies as they are,”39 while others believe – and as 
parents, raise their kids to believe – in “the moral importance of shaping our… bodies to advance 
our… interests.”40 Ashley’s parents chose to pursue the latter option, given their circumstances. 
However, Wilfond et al. argue that for parents of children with profound developmental 
disabilities, it is exponentially more difficult to decide what to believe in this realm, and what to 
teach their children to believe. When there are options available to alter your child’s body in 
order to increase their quality of life, what is a parent supposed to choose? It must also be noted 
that there exist many parents – like Ashley’s – who themselves do not have disabilities, and 
therefore cannot exactly understand what it is like to live with them. Some may argue that this is 
an unfair judgement for able-bodied people to make on behalf of people with disabilities (as their 
proxy decision makers). However, Wilfond et al. argue that as a society, we should be more 
understanding of parents of children with profound disabilities, and that they should have the 
right to choose what is best for their children in the realm of what is best for their family, in the 
case that it is the parents who are the people who have raised their children for the entirety of 
their lives. From this experience, parents do, Wilfond et al. assert, have an understanding of what 
 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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is in the best interest of their children. 
Next, Wilfond et al. believe that children with profound disabilities face more familial 
and social barriers in society than children without, partially due to the limits they face as their 
bodies grow, which makes their parents’ efforts to help them participate in familial and social 
activities all the more difficult [due to their fully-grown adult size]. According to Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, children who have the capability to play – which can be 
defined as “being able to laugh, to play, [and] to enjoy recreational activities,”41 and which 
Nussbaum lists as one of the central ten capabilities necessary to live – will live a more 
“dignified or minimally flourishing life.”42 Living a life of dignity, according to Nussbaum, is 
directly correlated to a greater quality of life by having access to more capabilities, which ideally 
leads to increased functionings of those capabilities. 
In the case of Ashley, growth attenuation ultimately “[reduced] the child’s final adult 
height from a predicted five feet four inches to approximately four feet six inches.”43 The 
connection between administering estrogen and increased capabilities lies in the caregivers 
(whether it be parents, guardians, or others) who are the intermediaries for children with PDDs to 
achieve these functionings. Growth attenuation can help these caregivers “lift and move [the 
child] more easily.”44 Therefore, Wilfond et al. argue, children who are administered estrogen 
patches in order to fulfill the growth attenuation intervention – as is shown in the Ashley 
treatment –are more likely to be able to engage in familial and social activities with their families 
and friends, thus leading to increased capabilities, which therefore increases their quality of life. 
Ultimately, Wilfond et al. conclude that while it should only be administered to in 
 
41 Nussbaum, “Capabilities,” 34. 
42 Nussbaum, “Capabilities,” 32. 
43 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,” 27. 
44 Ibid. 
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children with profound developmental disabilities, “growth attenuation [like in the Ashley 
treatment] can be morally permissible under specific conditions and after thorough 
consideration.”45 The authors justify this by citing that “parents of children with profound 
developmental disabilities face a complicated set of challenges and should be afforded respect 
and considerable deference in making the complex and difficult decisions unique to their child’s 
care.”46 
 Now that I have laid out Wilfond et al.’s argument, I will next analyze which pro tanto 
principles are conflicting in their article. 
According to Alex Rajczi, professor of philosophy at Claremont McKenna College, pro 
tanto principles are “principles that tell us that we have strong reasons to do something, 
even though there might be circumstances where those reasons are outweighed or 
overridden by competing moral considerations.”47 For example, most people place 
importance on the pro tanto principle of being honest, or of telling the truth. Generally, 
pro tanto principles are morally charged; however, because as humans we are all 
inherently different and therefore have different sets of morals, what happens when there 
are multiple pro tanto considerations at play? As Rajczi describes, “ethical controversies 
often arise when two or more pro tanto principles pull us in different directions.”4849  
 
When reasoning through pro tanto principles, taking various important attributes of each 
principle into deep consideration is necessary. Rajczi describes a few main ideas to take into 
account when reasoning through these principles and making a decision about which ones take 
precedence over others. The first is “the degree of harm that will result from acting or not acting 
on each obligation.”50 Next, Rajczi cites the “number of people harmed”51 as well as “mitigation 
of harm[ – that is,] whether the harm to the people involved can be mitigated.”52 
 
45 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,” 29. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Rajczi, “Conflicts Between Pro Tanto Principles,” 1. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Allison Hill, “The Importance of Dignity: How Does it Affect Individuals with Severe Cognitive Disabilities?” 
(Phil186 Essay, Claremont McKenna College, 2019). 
50 Rajczi, “Conflicts Between Pro Tanto Principles,” 3. 
51 Rajczi, “Conflicts Between Pro Tanto Principles,” 4. 
52 Ibid. 
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The first pro tanto principle that is at play in the Wilfond et al. argument is the moral 
obligation that we have as a society (and as humans in general) to value every human being 
equally. This includes children with profound developmental disabilities, and Wilfond et al. cite 
that they “are concerned that many people and institutions in society do not positively value 
people with profound developmental disabilities”53 – that is, they do not believe that everyone 
treats these people with the same dignity and respect (or simply, equally) as they would anyone 
else without a disability. However, this is a tricky idea to implement, because there are many 
differences between people with profound disabilities – especially children – and people without. 
Some I discussed earlier in this chapter, like if people with such profound cognitive disabilities 
cannot be deemed competent enough to give informed consent about their own medical 
decisions. The issue here is that if we value every human equally, we fail to adjust for these large 
differences (e.g. disabilities). Would it be valuing every human equally to impose a universal 
government-funded education system that fails to provide resources for children with special 
needs or learning disabilities, because everyone should be given the same, equal resources? No; 
that would not be treating, nor valuing, every human being equally. Instead, it would be catering 
to the majority, or to the people without the need for such resources. Therefore, it is also 
important to take into account Ashley’s case, and distinguish that administering growth 
attenuation to a child without a profound developmental disability is not considered equal 
treatment to administering the same treatment to a child such as Ashley. However, it does result 
in valuing Ashley similarly to other non-disabled children, as the Ashley treatment adjusts for 
inequalities by helping bring Ashley’s quality of life up to a more equal level [to her peers]. This 
is why applying Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is so important; because if we view equality 
 
53 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,” 28. 
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through the lens of access to basic capabilities, it can be easier to understand how we can work to 
get people with disabilities to a similar quality of life as people without disabilities. 
The next two competing pro tanto principles at odds in Wilfond et al.’s argument are: (1) 
“the moral importance of learning to accept our (and our children’s) bodies as they are”54 and (2) 
“the moral importance of shaping our (and our children’s) bodies to advance our (and their) 
interests.”55 In the case of Ashley, her parents chose the latter, but not for reasons rooted in vain. 
Many others have engaged in this debate as well and posited their opinions as to which pro tanto 
principle here should take precedence; probably as a result of Ashley’s case gaining so much 
public attention. For example, Wilfond et al. cite some people’s “concerns about growth 
attenuation’s adverse impact on… the disability community’s progress in overcoming societal 
challenges.”56 That is, growth attenuation being a way that shaping one’s body can advance 
one’s own interest. 
Let us break down these competing principles by giving a different kind of example, 
which does the exact opposite of growth attenuation. It is a medical intervention called growth 
hormone (GH) therapy, which delivers shots of testosterone to “children with GH deficiency and 
others with very short stature.”57 GH “rises during childhood, peaks during puberty, and declines 
from middle age onward,”58 so it is easiest and most effective to initiate GH therapy in children 
and adolescents, since it “stimulates the growth of bone and cartilage.”59 What this intervention 
primarily works to achieve is increasing final adult growth height. While sometimes GH therapy 
 
54 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,” 29. 
55 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,” 29. 
56 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,” 29. 
57 “Growth Hormone, Athletic Performance, and Aging.” Harvard Health Publishing: Harvard Medical School, 
Harvard, May 2010, www.health.harvard.edu/diseases-and-conditions/growth-hormone-athletic-performance-and-
aging. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid. 
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is administered to children with other underlying or accompanying health issues, there are also 
those who use GH therapy solely to get their height up to scale with their peers. In this case, it 
seems as though the former pro tanto principle should take precedence. What is wrong with 
being below average height, if that person is not diagnosed with dwarfism – which, in addition to 
being a person of short stature, you also are subject to a wide array of accompanying health 
problems, which GH therapy can help mitigate – and that person’s parents simply want to 
administer the medical intervention in order for their child to fit in with their peers? This solution 
seems relevant, but does not really fall under the principle of accepting one’s body as it is, nor 
does it fall under the principle of modifying one’s body to advance their own interests, because 
the interests here are unclear. However, this is a common situation that is compared to growth 
attenuation. Therefore, in the case of Ashley, the reasons to modify her body are much clearer 
than with GH therapy: to increase her capabilities and therefore her quality of life, and for her 
parents to be able to more easily take care of her in order for Ashley to maintain her presence in 
familial and recreational activities. Because the harms of growth attenuation are slim after the 
initial intervention, the persons harmed are one in this case: Ashley. The degree of harm is also 
small, since the treatment would be only benefiting Ashley by decreasing her discomfort that 
would have been associated with puberty and growing. 
This concern brings up another set of competing pro tanto considerations: a) the potential 
adverse impacts on Ashley individually versus b) the impacts of the disabled community as a 
whole. While it is clear that the relatively immediate effects of growth attenuation – specifically 
the Ashley treatment – are a shorter final adult height and the discontinuation of puberty, there 
did not exist extensive research on the lasting effects and implications of such an intervention at 
the time it was administered. This poses a significant risk to Ashley as an individual, and the 
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implications for her health and well-being down the line. In addition, the mitigation of harm 
would be very difficult since the treatment would have already be implemented years prior. 
While it would essentially only be one individual harmed if Ashley were in fact, to face harms 
from the treatment, the second consideration is the potential adverse impacts on the disabled 
community as a whole. The pro tanto consideration at play, therefore, would be preserving the 
disabled community’s progress in bodily acceptance and “overcoming societal challenges.”60 
Since this is a large group of people who have worked tirelessly for years to establish themselves 
as worthy and equal in society, there is a fair degree of harm associated with interfering with a 
disabled person’s natural growth patterns and puberty in order to advance the interests of her 
caretakers. This is exactly the case with the Ashley treatment. Ashley’s parents are not only two 
non-disabled people who made a life-altering decision on behalf of their daughter, but they also 
went against the principles that people with disabilities have worked so long to prove to society: 
that all bodies are okay as is and deserve respect. However, an important point that Wilfond et al. 
posit is their belief that “parents of children with profound developmental disabilities face a 
complicated set of challenges and should be afforded respect and considerable deference in 
making the complex and difficult decisions unique to their children’s care.”61 In this respect, I 
think that the pro tanto principle of valuing Ashley as an individual should take precedence over 
the disabled community as a whole. 
Through the medical intervention that is the Ashley treatment, Ashley obtains more 
capabilities to function in ways that make her distinctly human (recall: Nussbaum’s list of ten 
basic capabilities in Section II). Among this list is her ability to “participate in more social and 
 
60 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,” 29. 
61 Ibid. 
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recreational activities,”62 which is an example of play. According to Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach, children who have access to the capability of play -- which can be defined as “being 
able to laugh, to play, [and] to enjoy recreational activities,”63 and which Nussbaum lists as one 
of the central ten capabilities necessary to live -- will live a more “dignified or minimally 
flourishing life.”64 
Ashley’s treatment resulted in her growth attenuation, which ended up being ten inches 
shorter than her predicted final adult height. Because Ashley has profound developmental 
disabilities, her shorter height aided her parents (who, in this case, are also her caregivers) in 
“[lifting and moving Ashley] more easily.”65 Therefore, as a child who received growth 
attenuation treatment, Ashley was more likely to be able to engage in in familial and social 
activities with their families and friends. From Nussbaum’s definition of play, this result leads to 
access to increased capabilities in the sphere of “play,” which increases quality of life. 
  
 
62 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,” 27. 
63 Nussbaum, “Capabilities,” 34. 
64 Nussbaum, “Capabilities,” 32. 
65 Wilfond et al., “Navigating Growth Attenuation,” 27. 
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V. S D Edwards’ Potential Objections to the Ashley Treatment 
Edwards lays out “five main objections raised against the Ashley treatment,” and 
ultimately responds to each objection with reasoning through why each objection does not stand. 
In this section of the paper, however, I will focus on the counterarguments he posits to the moral 
permissibility of the Ashley treatment, and how his argument develops to form a conclusion. 
The first reason Edwards presents as to why the Ashley treatment is not morally 
permissible is the “violation of Ashley’s rights [that] occurred, either her rights to bodily 
integrity or her rights to develop normally.”66 Recall that since Ashley was not capacitated and 
therefore unable to give informed consent for her own medical decisions, her parents were left to 
be her proxy decision maker. While this is a normal practice in the medical field, and is generally 
upheld well, since families tend to have a good idea of what the patient might want, this was not 
the case for Ashley. Her parents made a decision to radically change her body, past the point of 
return, against its natural trajectory. “Furthermore, this [was done] without her consent,”67 which 
directly violates one of Ashley’s rights cited in the Convention on the Protection and Promotion 
of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, that “every person with disabilities has a 
right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity on an equal basis with others.”68 By 
removing her breast buds, performing a hysterectomy at the age of six, and administering 
estrogen in order to stunt her growth, Ashley’s right to physical integrity “has plainly been 
violated,”69 Edwards argues. 
The next two objections that Edwards postulates are: a) that “the treatment involves using 
Ashley as a mere means to the ends of the parents; in other words that they were the main 
 
66 Edwards, “Ashley X,” 40. 
67 Edwards, “The Ashley treatment,” 342. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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beneficiaries of the interventions and the purpose of the interventions was to benefit them as 
opposed to benefitting Ashley herself (If it is permissible to alter surgically disabled people for 
the convenience of their care-givers, this suggests that disabled bodies are objects)’”70 and b) that 
Ashley’s parents chose to go through with the medical intervention for the sake of ease of their 
care for her, which would be appealing to Ashley’s parents’ best interests71, not her own. This is 
not only morally impermissible, but also dangerous, as it takes advantage of an individual who is 
part of a bigger community of vulnerable individuals. Disabled people are at higher risk for 
abuse, both in care facilities and in their own homes, at the hands of their caregivers. If the 
Ashley treatment were to be deemed morally permissible, it would set a dangerous precedent for 
other parents and caretakers of children with profound developmental disabilities, that it is okay 
to severely alter their bodies a) without their consent and b) to appeal to their own best interests. 
The last objection Edwards posits is that it sets a precarious example that “‘it is justified 
to alter the body of a permanently incompetent person without their consent, providing it can be 
shown to be in that person’s best interests’.”72 This is a problem of a slippery slope. Questions 
that may be asked as a follow-up to the Ashley treatment are: What does the fact that the Ashley 
treatment was successfully, and legally, carried out mean for the disabled community as a 
whole? What other kinds of treatment on disabled persons will this open the door to in the 
future? The fact that the Ashley treatment was deemed ethically sound by Disability Rights 
Washington when they conducted an investigation into Seattle Children’s Hospital (where the 
Ashley treatment took place) leads to certain implications about similar cases in which the 
precedent is set that “it is morally permissible to alter the bodies of non-autonomous disabled 
 
70 Edwards, “Ashley X,” 41. 
71 Recall their reasoning for pursuing the treatment in the first place; that growth attenuation would help them be 
able to move Ashley better; change her diapers; and strap her into her wheelchair easier. 
72 Edwards, “Ashley X,” 41. 
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individuals for the convenience of their carers.”73 Humans are humans, and therefore deserve to 
be treated as so, regardless of disability. It is therefore even more important that the needs and 
rights of individuals with disabilities are protected against decisions that could harm them, 
which, according to Edwards, is an issue in the case of Ashley. 
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VI. Conclusion 
A common misconception of non-doctors in regard to modern Western medicine is that 
the Hippocratic Oath, which is the oath that medical students take before becoming physicians, 
includes the phrase “first, do no harm.” While this is an accurate translation from the original 
Hippocratic Oath, written in Greek, the phrase has been tailored and eventually omitted from the 
oath. Today, that part ceases to exist. While it is important for physicians to treat their patients 
well and not intentionally do harm to them, if present society and the medical community were 
going to live by this ancient rule today, doctors would not be able to give cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR) or even perform surgery without breaking the oath. These medical 
interventions are just a few of many that do, in fact, harm patients; however, they are necessary 
invocations of immediate harm or pain that lead to larger courses of treatment.74 The case of 
Ashley and the medical intervention that was carried out in order to benefit her is no exception to 
this rule. 
 I support of the argument that Ashley’s parents’ decision to go through with the 
hysterectomy, removal of her breast buds, and administering estrogen patches, all in order to stop 
her from growing and from continuing on with puberty, is a morally permissible act. As 
discussed in previous sections, Ashley’s continued growth and puberty would have made it 
increasingly difficult for her parents to care for her – and their care is the source of Ashley’s 
well-being. In addition, not going through with this particular medical intervention would have 
most likely presented issues of discomfort for Ashley herself, since her weight gain from 
growing would have increased her risk of developing bed sores and ulcers; her breast 
development would have made it uncomfortable for her to be strapped into her wheelchair; and 
 
74 An example would be cutting someone open in order to perform open-heart surgery, which, while imposing 
immediate injuries, would ultimately save the patient’s life.  
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the onset of puberty would have caused discomforts from her menstruation cycle, including 
abdominal cramps. 
Next, Ashley’s parents’ motivation seems genuine, if they were willing to go 
through the trials, tribulations, healthcare costs, ethics committee meetings, and public 
backlash from sharing Ashley’s story on their blog, all in order to improve their 
daughter’s quality of life. As Edwards points out, “if Ashley’s parents did not really care 
about her, they could simply have arranged institutional care for her.”75 While it is 
unclear why they chose to take the former route as opposed to the latter, it is a well-
known fact that institutions for disabled people are hot spots for abuse and neglect, and 
Ashley’s parents likely knew this as parents of a disabled child. It is a position of much 
harder work and effort to be Ashley’s caregiver than it would have been to admit her to 
an institution. Therefore, it seems as though Ashley’s parents’ motivation is genuine, and 
that the medical interventions that took place – that is, the Ashley treatment – were in fact 
in Ashley’s best interest in terms of maximizing her access to capabilities through 
functionings. 
While I believe that the Ashley treatment is morally permissible, that is not to say 
that there exist issues with the treatment itself. Wilfond et al. conclude in their paper that 
they “agreed to the compromise that growth attenuation can be morally permissible under 
specific conditions and after thorough consideration,”76 and I agree. The overall principle 
of growth attenuation is okay with me, provided that it is working to increase the 
capabilities of an individual such that a better quality of life will result. I believe this to 
be true with Ashley’s case. Ashley was able to continue to enjoy spending time with her 
 
75 Edwards, “Ashley X,” 41. 
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loved ones, participate in recreational activities of “play,” and even continue living with her 
family due to the ease of case. Let me be clear that I do not believe that every child with 
disabilities should be able to have access to the same treatment Ashley went through. However, 
growth attenuation allowed for Ashley’s quality of life to improve and for her to reach a level of 
justice otherwise unforeseen in her future, which was made possible by the Ashley treatment. 
Therefore, I elect that the Ashley treatment is in fact morally sound in its efforts, and am 
interested to see how medicine develops to adjust for people with profound developmental 
disabilities in the future to achieve the same goals. 
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